All eggs in the A.I. basket
Absent any major negative shock, the U.S. economy should continue growing at a healthy rate or even accelerate. Faith in the promise of A.I. is the overwhelming driver of demand; both through continued extraordinary growth in A.I. CAPEX (~2.5-3% of GDP) and the extra consumer spending caused by outsized equity returns (A.I. firms account for 40% of the S&P 500 market cap). The top quintile of households accounts for an estimated 45% of consumer spending. Where the average European household builds wealth by saving 15% of its income, its American counterpart builds wealth through capital gains and consumes 95% of its income. Thus, a disappointment in the monetization calendar of A.I. model providers would result in both a downturn in CAPEX and an equity selloff triggering a contraction in consumption (70% of GDP), as wealthier households save in excess to rebalance their net worth. Fed emergency measures would limit contagion to the wider financial system. This recessionary scenario is the main threat to the outlook but is not our base case. From 2027 onwards, the execution of A.I. investment is also expected to be encumbered by regulatory backlash and supply bottlenecks. Though exports are strongly supported by oil & gas and digital services, this is more than offset by surging imports of capital and intermediate goods related to the A.I. buildout (servers, advanced semiconductors, electrical equipment).
Notwithstanding a healthy economy at the aggregate, the production cost environment has become more challenging for smaller firms further away from the technological frontier. Business insolvencies overall are rising at a 16% YoY rate and stand at 23% above pre-pandemic levels as of Q2 2026. The volatile tariff policy has resulted in persistent uncertainty, higher input cost and more demanding inventory management, despite the welcome tailwind of IEEPA refunds (0.5% of GDP). Inflation has remained stubbornly above target and, though currently on a moderation path, is at risk of being pushed up by supply pressures (geopolitical shocks to energy, food inflation driven by a volatile climate and fertilizer shortages). This backdrop is making it difficult for the Fed to continue cutting rates. With bond markets increasingly scrutinizing U.S. public finances, the sovereign premium is also widening. Financial conditions are thus becoming more onerous. Its most visible consequences are a real-estate market subdued by persistently high mortgage rates (and a recession in residential construction); as well as rising defaults among firms reliant on private credit lenders. Despite being vulnerable to two potential major destabilizing shocks (A.I. disruption and the immigration crackdown), the labor market should remain roughly in balance slightly below full employment (~4%), unless and until we start seeing stronger evidence of A.I.-related layoffs. The Fed is expected to keep rates around in the 3.5-4% range through 2027 but remains highly flexible given the significant changes happening in the economy.
US dollar dominance allows fiscal largesse; external deficits will persist
Were it not for the attractiveness of US government bonds as the world’s benchmark reserve asset, the fiscal trajectory would be cause for imminent concern. Due to a combination of higher interest rates and persistently high primary deficits (3% of GDP), interest expenditure has ballooned from a pre-pandemic average of 1.5% of GDP to 3.1% in 2025 and is expected to rise further as growth normalizes but rates stay high. The largest items of spending (social security, health and defense) will continue to grow amid population ageing, rising medical costs, and the need to renew and maintain military capabilities. The push for improving government cost-efficiency should be comparatively small, with the largest potential targets for spending being politically sensitive (spending on veterans, opioid crisis, housing assistance). The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which introduces wide-reaching tax cuts while only partially reducing spending (healthcare, food aid and green energy subsidies), should result in a net increase of USD 3-3.7 tn. to the federal debt over the next ten years. We see potential for continued growing pressure on sovereign rates in the medium term.
The country will continue to accumulate large current account deficits for the foreseeable future. First, the good health of the consumer will yield persistent demand for imports, foreign investment should continue flowing into the economy, while the additional deficit spending will create financing requirements. Tariffs could create a reduction of overall imports in the very short run, but trade partner diversification should progressively offset that effect. The US’s external vulnerabilities would only become an issue if the statuses of the dollar as reserve currency and treasuries as haven assets were to significantly erode. Despite some early signs of this in recent years (rising yields, gold bull runs), the USD’s dominance over other fiat currencies remains substantial.
House expected to flip Democrat, trade war to endure
President Donald Trump and the Republican party secured a decisive victory in the November 2024 elections, winning the presidency by a comfortable margin in the electoral college (312/538 votes) and in both houses of Congress (220/435 House seats, 53/100 Senate seats). Given the very slim 5-seat majority, the record number of representatives retiring (43), the high number of competitive districts (42), and the tendency for incumbents to be sanctioned in midterm elections; the House is expected to flip Democrat. Republicans stand better chances of keeping the Senate, but it is also at risk. Majorities in both chambers have been crucial for passing flagship policies, such as extending and expanding the 2017 tax cuts, boosting budget for immigration enforcement, restricting eligibility conditions for Medicaid, and rolling back clean energy and EV tax credits. Most types of legislation also require 60 votes in the Senate, giving Democrats some power to obstruct policy and occasionally leading to government shutdowns. The Supreme Court leans conservative (6-3), and its commitment to act as a check on executive power is being challenged by the White House willing to test boundaries. However, when it came to the visibly unlawful use of IEEPA “reciprocal’ tariffs and the President’s attempts to dismiss Fed governors, the Court protected institutions. We expect the White House to persist in attempts to influence the Fed, and to fail as long as Fed policymakers are protected by the Court.
Given the precedent set by the IEEPA ruling, the White House is focusing on re-establishing its desired overall tariff range (somewhere in the 10-15% range) using more robust legal authorities. Each tariff package is expected to be challenged in court, triggering a multi-month process testing its legal soundness. We expect continued use of tariff threats as a foreign policy negotiation tool to be used to pressure other countries on diverse topics (Greenland, security and migration, drug trade, supporting individuals close to the President, etc…). The relationship with China is a major source of potential instability. There is a deep-rooted strategic competition between both superpowers. Both have used a variety of tools to pressure their rival’s economy (tariffs, currency manipulation, industrial subsidies, export restrictions of critical inputs such as semiconductors and rare earth minerals).
At the time of writing, the relationship is undergoing relative détente, but this state of affairs can be quickly reversed. The US will continue to seek decoupling from China in trade and finance, while accelerating efforts to win the technological race on A.I. As for the EU, the 2025 Turnberry agreement caps tariffs at 15%, though it remains unclear whether the US will uphold it during diplomatic tensions, such as those involving Spain and digital service taxation. Significant uncertainty continues to cloud the future of the USMCA agreement with Mexico and Canada (20% of the US’s total trade, 5% of GDP). The pact will expire in 2036 unless there is an agreement for an extension to 2042; and with it the privileged access to the US market that has allowed for a deeply integrated north American supply chain. Our working assumption remains that some solution will be found that preserves privileged access for Canada and Mexico, but that episodes of tension will flare up intermittently over the short term (including threatened and executed tariffs).

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