Largely resilient economic growth
The Swiss economy expanded by a robust 1.4% in 2025, unchanged from the previous year. This is somewhat encouraging as the small and open economy (foreign trade accounts for a very high 125% of GDP) is very exposed to external shocks. The generally sluggish global economic performance and recently introduced US tariffs (the country took in 19% of Switzerland’s exports in 2025) are resultantly weighing on Swiss real GDP performance. We are therefore forecasting a gradual slowdown in 2026. On that score, Q1 2026’s performance was disappointing as the economy grew by a lacklustre 0.4% year on year (y/y) before switching shifting into a much higher gear in April-June. Driven by the solid performance in the chemicals and pharmaceutical sectors which account for more than 50% of Switzerland’s exports, real GDP growth accelerated to 1.5% y/y, its highest level since 2021. On an equally positive note, private consumption will be supported by the robust labour market. The unemployment rate stood at a very low 3.1% in July 2026 and real wages increased by 1.6% in 2025, which was the fastest rate of expansion since 2020. After collapsing in March following the outbreak of the Iran War, consumer confidence rose for four consecutive months in the April-July period and is currently ranging only slightly below last year’s reading (minus 35 points versus minus 33 points one year earlier). This is also cause for cautious optimism regarding private consumption in 2026-2027, particularly given the fact that pensions are set to rise, too. Low interest rates and the robust housing market will also support the economy while fiscal spending has increased to a certain degree, which will impact positively on growth too. The biggest risks for the Swiss economy in the outlook period will come from developments abroad: geopolitical turmoil puts upward pressure on the Swiss franc (a classic haven currency), which might require constant central bank intervention at a time when ongoing defragmentation of international trade is also creating headwinds for Switzerland’s export industries.
Against the backdrop of lower inflationary pressure, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) cut rates from 1.75% in June 2023 to 0.0% in mid-2025. Unlike the ECB, the SNB did not increase its key policy rate in the aftermath of the outbreak of the Iran War as the energy price shock was much smaller in Switzerland than in the neighbouring eurozone. Inflation temporarily spiked from 0.1% in early 2026 to 0.6% in both April and May before moderating to 0.4% in July. Switzerland is shielded against price increases on global energy markets for two reasons. First, the strong franc keeps import price inflation at bay. Second, unlike in some other European states, oil and gas do not feature prominently in the country’s electricity mix which is split into 60% hydroelectric, 30% nuclear and only 0.5% hydrocarbons. However, as domestic transportation costs depend on oil prices, inflation is set to rise somewhat in 2026-27 compared with 2025, but will nonetheless stay comfortably towards the lower end of the SNB’s target range of 0%-2%, thereby reducing the likelihood of interest rate increases. This should also have positive effects on corporate investment activity, but a high degree of geopolitical uncertainty will counterbalance some of these effects for the foreseeable future.
At the same time, corporate insolvencies have risen sharply in recent quarters. In 2025, insolvencies spiked by 54%, reaching a new record high of 9,314 cases. That said, recent changes in insolvency regulations which now force public creditors such as tax and customs authorities or social security providers to launch proceedings earlier have played a crucial role in the trend as many insolvencies are transpiring earlier. Unfortunately, data for January to June 2026 shows that the 2025 trend is likely to continue: corporate bankruptcies rose by 43% in H1 2026, thereby highlighting an unusually high level of credit risk in the country. Except for the construction sector, all other industries reported more failures.
Public debt is low and the current account surplus sizeable, albeit shrinking
Unlike in most other developed markets, public debt stocks and fiscal balance are not a source of concern for Switzerland. As a result of the “Relief Package 27”, a cost-cutting measure introduced to lower federal spending in areas such as decarbonisation, education, integration and development aid, the federal budget foresees another surplus in 2026-2027. Defence and the government pension system will see higher spending in the forward period with pension spending being impacted by demographic change. In addition, following a successful referendum in 2024, pensioners will benefit from the introduction of a thirteenth monthly installment each year, the first of which will be paid in December 2026. Mainly thanks to higher-than-expected corporate taxes on profits in the pharma industry, Switzerland’s public accounts will see a structural surplus, which will also enable a smaller-than-initially-planned increase in the VAT rate from 2028. In contrast to the average government debt stock in the eurozone which stood at almost 90% of GDP in Q2 2026, Switzerland, thanks to its solid budget policies, has a public debt burden of less than 40%, a rate that is likely to drop further in the outlook period.
Furthermore, Coface’s excellent country risk rating for Switzerland of A1 is also underpinned by its sizeable and durable current account surplus. The primary income balance (e.g., net income from investments abroad and cross-border workers) and the services balance structurally post deficits. In addition, a persistent deficit exists on the secondary income (transfer) balance, which is the result of foreign employees who work in Switzerland sending home a part of their income. In Q2 2026, 1.9 million workers in Switzerland had a foreign passport. This equates to almost 35% of the workforce (up from 25% in 1991). However, these deficits are more than compensated for by the large surplus in goods trade. In this context, the chemicals and pharmaceutical sectors are crucial to the country’s external accounts as they generate 53% of goods exports. While the strong franc, geopolitical risks and the introduction of trade barriers will chip away at the current account surplus going forward, it is expected to remain above 6% of GDP in 2026-27.
The existence of ample Swiss assets abroad thanks to persistent and consistent current account surpluses enables the country to enjoy a substantial positive net international investment position (CHF 974 billion, equivalent to 112% of GDP in Q1 2026), the size of which varies according to stock market prices and the USD/CHF exchange rate. Furthermore, the SNB’s sizeable foreign reserves also reduce risks.
Consensus keeps political risk low, but the Bilateral Agreements III with the EU still need ratification
The Swiss political system is extremely stable owing to the country’s tradition of political consensus. The main decisions are taken by referenda. The Federal Council, i.e., the government, comprises seven ministers. The President is elected from this group for one year and subsequently alternates. Since 1959, the composition of the Federal Council is arranged according to the so-called “magic formula”, with the first three parties in the general election receiving two seats each, and the fourth party one seat. To reach the Federal Council, a “new” party must finish in the top four at two consecutive elections, which is rare. Accordingly, the party composition of the Council has not changed since the last general election in October 2023. The right-wing national-conservative SVP, the social democratic SP and the liberal FDP have two seats, while the Christian-democratic Center party has one seat. The next general election is scheduled for late 2027 and the SVP is currently leading the polls with 29%, well ahead of the SP (18%) and the Center Party (15%).
Relations between Switzerland and the European Union have improved. The main problem stems from their trade agreements, which also include certain migration and employee protection rules. The Bilateral Agreements I and II of 2002 and 2005, and a total of 140 individual agreements currently apply. In 2008, negotiations began on an all-encompassing trade agreement that would summarise and update the existing individual agreements. However, after years of negotiations, the Swiss government decided in 2021 not to sign the final agreement as it was clear that it would have been rejected in a referendum. The role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as a dispute settlement forum that could limit Switzerland’s sovereignty was rejected. The preservation of the high level of wages and employee protection in Switzerland was a major bone of contention based on the fear of unbridled migration from the EU, as was the possible receipt of Swiss social assistance by EU citizens. Relations cooled, but negotiations resumed in 2023 and were finalised in late 2024 with a new agreement, dubbed “Bilaterals III”. The new agreement now includes a safeguard clause on migration. Free movement of persons between the EU and Switzerland may be restricted if it causes serious economic and social problems. If the EU does not agree to the restriction, a neutral arbitration court will decide the issue. The power of the ECJ will also be limited to maintain Switzerland’s sovereignty. If EU law conflicts with Swiss law, an arbitration tribunal will also rule on the matter. It does not have to refer to the ECJ to interpret EU law.
However, the Bilaterals III treaty has not yet been ratified and a referendum is expected to take place in 2027. Most political groups and the influential business community are supportive of the agreement but the SVP, the country’s biggest party, opposes closer ties with the EU. The defeat of the “No 10 million Switzerland” proposal in a referendum in June 2026 aimed at capping the population size (which would have had repercussions on the free movement agreements with the EU) signifies that the anti-EU camp has lost some ground recently, but it is not a given that the Bilaterals III agreement would necessarily be accepted in a referendum. The Federal Council has therefore decided to unbundle the overall package and create four partial agreements (free movement of persons and the coordination of land transport, electricity market, food safety and health). These partial agreements can then be voted on individually in referendums. Nevertheless, it is unclear how the EU will react if only parts of the agreement are approved. In addition, there is uncertainty about whether the Bilaterals III approval would require a “double majority”, meaning it would not only have to be approved by the majority of voters but also by a majority of cantons, which would be more difficult to achieve.

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